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TIME TO DEVELOP A POST-BUCKLEY APPROACH TO
REGULATING THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND
EXPENDITURES OF POLITICAL PARTIES: FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION V. COLORADO REPUBLICAN
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
The American governmental structure is known to all graduates of ninth grade civics or social studies classes as a three branch
system of checks and balances. This model is generally accurate.
However, it has broken down in the regulation of federal campaigns. The federal courts should take an aggressive approach to
the regulation of political committees, elections, and campaigns. As
the non-political actor in the equation, it may be up to the courts
to rectify and overcome the failures and problems of the campaign
finance system.
Campaign finance regulation presents the problem of who will
be responsible for ensuring that the American public is protected
from the potential abuses that exist where the only entities who are
subject to federal campaign finance regulations, the Congress and
the President, are the entities responsible for regulating. Congress
has little incentive to reform the status quo even if its members
were to benefit from increased party contributions in the form of
direct expenditures. Conflicts exist not only between the parties,
but also between the houses of Congress as to what reform is
appropriate, thus preventing any reform at all.' Comprehensive
reform has not occurred since Buckley because the Congress and
the President have little incentive to modify the current system.
There has been a general failure to protect the public interest
in the area of campaign finance. The legislature and executive
branches have an interest in ensuring their own political preserva-

1. See David B. Magleby, Prospectsfor Reform, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 245, 250-55 (Margaret L. Nugent

& John R. Johannes eds., 1990).
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tion. Because of these inherent structural self-interests, courts must
approach the regulation of federal elections in an activist manner.
The courts must address the problems that have arisen as a result
of prior judicial decisions and legislative or regulatory inaction.
The recent decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee2 (CRFCC) illustrates the need for a new approach to the campaign finance regulation of political parties. The
results of the decision in CRFCC provide a strong argument to
move beyond Buckley v. Valeo.3
In Buckley, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its 1974
amendments. 4 While the Court struck down certain limits on expenditures in federal campaigns as an impermissible restraint on the
First Amendment political expression rights of candidates, citizens,
and associations, it upheld contribution limits as serving the governmental interest of preventing "corruption" or the "appearance of
corruption." 5 The Court stated,
The contribution ceilings . . .serve the basic governmental
interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process
without directly impinging upon the rights of individual
citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and
discussion. By contrast, the First Amendment requires the
invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling . . . .These provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions
that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.
In spite of this relatively clear statement, the application of
Buckley in subsequent cases has resulted in vastly different treatment of political parties and independent political committees.7

2. 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 689 (1996).
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. Id. at 58-59.
5. Id. at 25.
6. Id. at 58-59.
7. Political committees are statutorily defined in 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (1994). The definition includes committees, clubs, associations, other groups of individuals, separate segregated funds, and local party committees that have met the requisite contribution or expenditure threshold to be regulated by the FECA. As used in this Comment, the term "independent political committee" includes any political entity that is not directly affiliated or
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After twenty years, the time has arrived for a new campaign
jurisprudence that treats parties and independent political committees equally. Moreover, such a change can occur without abandoning precedent. Courts must act aggressively in the area of campaign finance. Neither the legislature nor the executive branch has
effectively dealt with the "nonsensical, loopholeridden patchwork 8
that has emerged in the wake of Buckley and its progeny. The
federal courts can and must develop a cogent, coherent, and consistent approach to regulating all entities participating in the political
arena.
Specifically, the courts must seek to rectify the inequities that
exist between the First Amendment rights of political parties and
independent political committees. The current system fosters an
inequality in the First Amendment rights of parties and independent
political committees by allowing the latter to make independent
expenditures. The courts must end this prohibition on independent
political expenditures by political parties. The reliance on the fear
that independent expenditures by parties may result in corruption is
no longer tenable and must be abandoned. This can be accomplished without deviating from prior precedent if courts enter the
void of campaign finance regulation and actively seek to remedy
the inequities, abuses, and loopholes that have emerged since
Buckley.
I.

THE NEED FOR A PRAGMATIC VIEW OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES

To place this Comment's thesis in proper context, it is important to address two issues at the outset: the First Amendment interests of political parties and the role of the courts in regulating
federal campaign finance in light of the failure of Congress to
effectuate reform. It is clear that political parties have two essential
interests under the First Amendment. First, political parties have a
free speech interest.9 It has long been recognized that citizens,
controlled by a political party, excluding entities defined as political committees by 2
U.S.C. § 431(4)(C) (1994). Additionally, "independent political committee" will also be
used to describe individuals making independent political expenditures similar in nature to
those of the committees.
8. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 518 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
9. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
(1989) ("Indeed the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.").
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candidates, and associations have a right to engage in protected
political speech.'0 Campaign expenditures made in the process of
direct political speech are also constitutionally protected. However, the Supreme Court has refused to find that direct campaign
contributions are entitled to unlimited protection as "speech by
proxy,' "' 2 even though the independent or personal expenditure of
funds in support of a political candidate constitutes protected
speech. 3 Independent campaign expenditures are "political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' "14
Additionally, political parties have an associational interest
arising from the First Amendment. In addressing the rights of organizations engaging in political speech, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the freedom of association is inherently connected with the advancement of beliefs, ideas, and speech. This freedom of association protection also applies to partisan political
organizations. 6
The associational rights of political parties are derived from
the rights of its members to act independently as individuals when
engaging in political expression. Individuals have the right to organize with other individuals who share common political views and
ideas.'7 Because a party's rights are an amalgamation of the
individual rights of party members, "interference with the freedom
of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its
adherents."'"
The Supreme Court has stated that "the First Amendment right
to 'speak one's mind . . . on all public institutions' includes the
right to engage in 'vigorous advocacy' no less than 'abstract dis-

10. See California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 194
(1981) (noting that Buckley recognized that limitations placed upon campaign expenditures
by the FECA directly infringed upon political speech).
11. Id. at 195 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-48).
12. Id. at 196.
13. See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
14. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 and quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
32 (1968)).
15. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986)
(quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), which discusses
the application of the First Amendment to states).
16. Id.; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973).
17. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215.
18. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
122 (1981).
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cussion."" 9 With respect to political expression, the Court noted,
"In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the people-individually as citizens and candidates
and collectively as associations and political committees-who must
retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public
issues in a political campaign."2 When the First Amendment
rights of speech and association are restricted in a political setting,
the Court will only uphold limitations that are designed to combat
corruption or the perception of corruption.2' When a campaign
regulation burdens the rights of free speech and free association, it
will only be upheld "if it serves a compelling governmental interest." However, given this framework for the protection of political speech, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue
of limitations on expenditures by political parties under the First
Amendment.
II.

THE HISTORY OF CRFCC

The Tenth Circuit addressed the role and activities of political
parties during federal elections in Federal Election Commission v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee.' The case
came to the court of appeals after the district court dismissed an
action brought against the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee (Colorado Republicans) and its treasurer.2 4 The FEC
brought suit after the Colorado Democratic Party alleged that the
Colorado Republicans had violated the spending limits established
in 2 U.S.C. § 44la(d)(3).' The Colorado Republicans spent

19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964) (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) and NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963))).
20. Id. at 57.
21. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
22. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225 (1989).
23. 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 1017.
25. Under 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1994), contributions by state and national political party
committees in federal elections are limited. The statute reads as follows:
(d) Expenditures by national committee, State committee, or subordinate committee of State committee in connection with general election campaign of
candidates for Federal office
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions, the national committee of a political party and a State committee of a political party,
including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may make
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$15,000 on radio advertisements in early 1986 opposing the Senate
candidacy of Timothy E. Wirth, a Democrat who eventually won
the election later that year.' 6 At the time of the ads, Wirth had
not officially become a candidate and the Republicans had yet to
nominate their candidate for the Senate.'
The dispute arose because the Colorado Republicans assigned
its right to make expenditures for the 1986 senatorial campaign to
the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC).28 The Colorado Democratic Party claimed that the $15,000 expenditure by
the Colorado Republicans violated the spending limit established in
2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) because it was made in addition to coordi-

expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office, subject to the limitation contained in paragraphs
(2) and (3) of this subsection.
(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of
a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is a
affiliated with such a party which exceeds(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to only
one Representative, the greater of(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State
(as certified under subsection (e) or this section); or
(ii) $20,000.
26. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1017-18.
27. Id. The ads claimed that Wirth had been less than honest in presenting his ideological position on issues seemingly important to Coloradans. The advertisement, "Wirth
Facts #1," read,
"Paid for by the Colorado Republican State Central Committee.
Here in Colorado we're used to politicians who let you know where they
stand, and I thought we could count on Tim Wirth to do the same. But the
last few weeks have been a real eye-opener. I just saw some ads where Tim
Wirth said he's for a strong defense and a balanced budget. But according to
his record, Tim Wirth voted against every major new weapon system in the
last five years. And he voted against the balanced budget amendment.
Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he doesn't have a right to
change the facts."
Id. at 1018 n.1.
28. Id. at 1019. The ability to assign the tight to make contributions allowed under 2
U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) was validated in the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Election
Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 41-43 (1981) (DSCC).
The Court stated, "Obviously, § 441a(d)(3) does not permit the NRSC to make expenditures in its own right. But, contrary to the Court of Appeals, it does not follow that the
NRSC may not act as an agent of a committee that is expressly authorized to make
expenditures." Id. at 33.
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nated expenditures by the NRSC' The case therefore centered on
whether running the anti-Wirth ads constituted an "expenditure in
connection with the general election campaign" of the Republican
nominee'
Political parties are prohibited from making independent expenditures by regulation. 3' Thus, the Democrats claimed that the
advertisements constituted a coordinated expenditure made in cooperation with the Republicans' candidates," which violated the limitations imposed by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).3 1 The Colorado Republicans counterclaimed that 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) unconstitutionally
limited expenditures.3 1 The district court found that the expenditure by the Colorado Republicans was a coordinated expenditure
but was not limited by § 441a(d)(3) because it "was not made in
connection with the 1986 Colorado senatorial campaign" and dismissed the FEC's complaint." The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis. It reversed and remanded the decision to the
district court to enter judgment in favor of the FEC.36 The court
also rejected the Republicans' counterclaim that the statute was an
unconstitutional limitation on their First Amendment rights.37 Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issues of (1)
whether the statute in question violates the First Amendment, (2)
whether the statute precludes advertising made when general election candidates have not yet been chosen, and (3) whether the
Tenth Circuit properly deferred to the FEC when the FEC failed to
follow proper rule-making procedures and failed to explain its

29. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1019. The Republicans were statutorily allowed to make
$103,248 in expenditures under 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3). Id.
30. Id. at 1018-19.
31. Id. at 1019. The Supreme Court noted in DSCC that under 11 C.F.R.
§ 110.7(B)(4) (1981), the FEC had forbidden state and national party committees from
making "independent expenditures." DSCC, 454 U.S. at 29 n.1. An independent expendi-

ture is one "made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at
the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994).
32. The Supreme Court in Buckley identified coordinated expenditures as those made
"in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized
committee of the candidate." 424 U.S. at 46 n.53.
33. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1019.
34. Id. at 1017.
35. Id. at 1019.
36. Id. at 1024.
37. Id.
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decision to depart from an earlier conflicting position."
EI.

REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE FOLLOWING BUCKLEY

Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals arguably followed precedent in deciding CRFCC, the decision illustrates several
reasons justifying a new approach to regulating campaign finance
and political parties. The decision in CRFCC manifests the weaknesses that have come to exist in the regulation of campaigns and
elections since Buckley. The Tenth Circuit's decision, like that of
other courts addressing campaign finance issues, is molded by three
separate influences: judicial precedent, congressional action, and
FEC actions. The manner in which this decision addresses each of
these influences exhibits many of the problems that have emerged
in this area of the law after Buckley.
First, the Tenth Circuit relied on precedent emerging from
Buckley. Judicial decisions following Buckley have often limited
their analysis to the Court's textual discussion in Buckley without
analyzing its applicability to situations that have emerged as a
result of the decision. Additionally, many courts, including the
Tenth Circuit, have shown deference to Congress in issues relating
to its legislation regulating federal elections. Congress clearly has
experience in the areas of elections and legislation. However, it is
precisely this interest and experience that ought to render Congress
subject to stricter scrutiny since it is responsible for regulating
itself in this area. Finally, the Tenth Circuit exhibited significant
deference to the FEC. Although deference to a regulatory agency is
appropriate when the agency has followed proper administrative
procedure, deference to decisions and regulations by the FEC is
problematic due to the politicized nature of the Commission and its
regulatory weaknesses. This is especially true where the Commission fails to address an apparently unexplained modification of
agency position.
A.

Judicial Decisions After Buckley and the Current View of
Campaign Finance

The current federal campaign finance structure exists in a
world where, as a result of Buckley, large institutional contributors
have proliferated.39 The rise of non-individual and non-party

38. 64 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1996) (No. 95-489).
39. FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALTIES 241 (1992)
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sources of support, be it direct in the form of contributions or
indirect in the form of independent expenditures, results from
Buckley and subsequent decisions." Congress has failed in its attempts at reforming campaign finance laws because true reform
requires a fundamental motivation for change.4 ' It is in this postBuckley world that the current problems of campaign finance reside
and develop.
The decision in CRFCC, like most decisions in the area of
federal elections, relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Buckley and its progeny. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the
Republicans' First Amendment claim had not been addressed in
Buckley.' However, it did not acknowledge the lack of precedent
that exists with respect to the claims of political parties, or claims

that limitations on independent expenditures by parties are an unconstitutional limitation. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit relied on
Buckley's analysis43 without addressing the post-Buckley political
world that exists today.
The Tenth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life'
(MCFL), noting that even though Buckley did not address a political party's claim that limitations on independent expenditures
impermissibly violate the First Amendment, "MCFL adopted much
of the reasoning in Buckley in analyzing the First Amendment
challenges . . . ."' However, this reliance on MCFL was mis(noting that organized giving dominates the current system of campaign finance).
40. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of Buckley
and Federal Elections Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480 (1985), on the practices of independent political committees).
41. Magleby, supra note 1, at 256 ("It is typically easier to build a legislative majority
to change a few things than to revamp the entire system. Comprehensive reform requires
a deeper commitment to change and a perception that something is seriously wrong.").
42. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1020-21. Specifically, the court cited the footnote in Buckley
where the Supreme Court answered certified constitutional questions relating to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971: "Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate
[constitutional] rights, in that it limits the expenditures of national or state committees of
political parties in connection with general election campaigns for federal office? Answer
NO, as to the Fifth Amendment challenge advanced by appellants." Id. (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 59 n.67).
43. Id. at 1024. Indeed, the court's analysis of corruption, as applied specifically to
parties, consisted of a discussion of the treatment of coordinated expenditures as contributions and independent expenditures as expenditures. Id. Although it cites NCPAC, the
court makes no mention of the emergence and rise of independent expenditures in the
wake of Buckley and NCPAC.
44. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
45. 59 F.3d at 1024 n.11.
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placed because MCFL presented factual and legal issues clearly
distinguishable form those presented in CRFCC.
In MCFL, a "nonprofit, nonstock corporation"' allegedly "violated the restriction on independent spending contained in
§ 441b,"'4 by spending treasury funds on a federal campaign.'
However, the Supreme Court rejected a prohibition on independent
expenditures by such entities, noting that "government must curtail
speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem
at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose
the danger that has prompted regulation."49 In light of this admonition by the Court in MCFL, it is not clear whether the analysis
addressing campaign expenditures and contributions by corporations, labor unions, or banks under 2 U.S.C. § 441b is applicable
to a claim arising under the regulation of campaign activities of
political parties and other committees governed by 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a. The basis for the difference between § 441a and § 441b is
the nature of the entities involved: political committees, which arise
from political affiliation, compared to corporations, labor unions,
and banks, which have specific economic interests and may participate in political activity only through the formation of separate
segregated funds. The resources of political committees are directly
tied to their popularity and representation of an identifiable political
view. The resources of entities regulated under § 441b are derived
from sources potentially unrelated to political popularity."0 The
limitations upon First Amendment expression under § 441b are due
to the potential such entities possess to manipulate the political
process due to their external sources of wealth.5 The regulations
presented in § 441b are arguably neither related nor applicable to
political committees regulated under § 441a.
The Tenth Circuit also relied on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee52 (DSCC), as support for its finding that the
Colorado Republicans made an impermissible expenditure in con-

46. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 265.
50. Id. at 257 ("Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that
resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.").
51. Id. at 258-59.
52. 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
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junction with a primary election. The Tenth Circuit noted that
according to the ruling in DSCC, parties are prevented from making independent expenditures. 3 The court cited 11 C.F.R. §
110.7(b)(4),54 the regulation addressed in DSCC, to hold that the
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated §
441a(d). However, the Supreme Court's interpretation of this regulation in DSCC applied only to general election expenditures. The
Tenth Circuit used the general election analysis present in DSCC tG
arrive at its decision on the pre-primary activities by the Colorado
Republicans.55 The court found that the expenditure by the Colorado Republicans was made prior to the primary and that it posed
the potential for greater corruption due to the likely control of the
party by incumbents. 6 The reliance on DSCC is problematic, as
the Tenth Circuit appeared to ignore the specific language of the
regulation.
Although not discussed in CRFCC, the Supreme Court did address the First Amendment interests of PACs under § 441a in
California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission 7
(CMA). The California Medical Association (CMA) challenged the
statutory limitations on contributions it could make to its PAC and
that could be made by its PAC, CALPAC. In its decision, the
Court held that the limitations on contributions to PACs and contributions by PACs did not violate the speech rights of the CMA
because § 441a did not limit "the amount CMA or any of its
members may independently expend in order to advocate political
views; rather, the statute restrains only the amount that CMA may
contribute to CALPAC." 5 The Court reiterated, however, that although a speech interest exists with respect to campaign contributions, "the 'speech by proxy' that CMA seeks to achieve through
its contributions to CALPAC is not the sort of political advocacy

53. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1019.
54. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1994) precludes national party committees, state committees, and subordinate committees of any state committee from making "independent expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office."
However, 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) only prohibits independent party expenditures in connection with the general election of candidates for Federal office, not primary elections as
was the case in the 1986 expenditure by the CRFCC.
55. See CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1021.
56. Id. at 1023-25.
57. California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
58. Id. at 195.
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that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment
protection."59
It is important to note, however, that CMA never addressed
the issue of independent expenditures, as the case was limited to
direct contributions to candidates through the mechanism of the
PAC. Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence that "this analysis
suggests that a different result would follow if § 441a(a)(1)(C)
were applied to contributions to a political committee established
for the purpose of making independent expenditures.
[C]ontributions to a committee that makes only independent expenditures pose no such threat [of corruption]." '
Political parties' ability and interest in engaging in the same
types of political speech as other independent political committees
through independent expenditures under the First Amendment has
not been directly addressed. Clearly, Buckley, MCFL, and CMA do
not deny the right of independent political entities to engage in
independent expenditures, as they pose no threat of corruption in
the eyes of the Court. Political parties possess the same First
Amendment rights as others engaging in political speech." However, courts have neither addressed nor analyzed the rights of parties and independent political committees together. This is probably
due to the nature of the entities and the litigation that has come
before the Supreme Court. The Court has not dealt with campaign
finance as it relates to the First Amendment rights of all political
entities. Challenges to the regulations have been made by either
independent political committees (NCPAC, MCFL, and CMA) or
political parties (DSCC, NRSC, Eu, and CRFCC) and the courts
have addressed their rights independently. Because no direct analysis of the rights of political parties versus those of independent
political committees has occurred, the courts must go beyond the
disjunctive views of entities' rights rendered in earlier decisions
and deal with the real issue: whether political parties and independent political committees should be entitled to the same rights to
engage in political speech in the form of independent expenditures.
Courts have previously compared the problems posed by contributions with those posed by expenditures in a collective and comprehensive manner. Buckley distinguished expenditures from contribu-

59. Id. at 196.
60. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
61. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
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tions, finding that contributions posed a greater threat of corruption
than expenditures, therefore meriting the regulation of contributions. 2 Such analysis of political parties' rights, as opposed to
independent political committees that make contributions and expenditures, has yet to occur.
B.

The Influence of Congress on the Court

The Tenth Circuit exhibited a high level of deference to Congress, which arguably is dangerous in the arena of campaign finance. In rejecting the claim of the Colorado Republicans that
large individual donors do not pose a threat of corruption or domination of the party, the Tenth Circuit deferred to the judgment of
Congress:
The members of Congress who enacted this law were surviving veterans of the election campaign process, and all
were members of organized political parties. They should
be considered uniquely qualified to evaluate the risk of
actual corruption or appearance of corruption from large
coordinated expenditures by political parties. This case is,
therefore, ideally postured for deference to the congressional will.'
The court correctly noted that Congress had intimate knowledge
of the campaign process and the potential for corruption. However,
deference to Congress in this area is unwise. Because Congress
regulates itself by establishing laws governing campaign finance,
courts should not defer to it on this issue, even if it has special
knowledge and experience. Congress has not addressed the problems that have emerged in campaign finance since the Buckley
decision.' Current campaign finance law has become a means of

62. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 (noting that contribution limits prevented corrnption "while
leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression").
63. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1024.
64. Since the decision in Buckley, Congress has failed to produce any real reform. See
generally HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & MONICA BAUER, FINANCING THE 1988 ELECION
110-40 (1991) (discussing the evolution of campaign finance law since the FECA was
passed in 1971). Partisan conflict has been a great impediment to addressing the deficiencies that have arisen since Buckley. Additionally, Alexander & Bauer argue that
[c]ampaign finance is a politician's issue, along with redistricting, it is the life
blood of most members of Congress. Though concerned about increasing
amounts of time spent raising funds, members have come to view election
reform attempts as partisan maneuvers designed to exploit their party's strengths
and their rivals' weakness .... For rather than make the public interest the
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ensuring reelection for incumbents. Members of Congress adeptly
manipulate the "loopholeridden patchwork" 65 to guarantee their
preservation.' Congress, acting in its own best interest, created
the FEC as an inherently weak entity. When an entity promulgates
the rules to which it is subject, close scrutiny should be required to
ensure that effective regulation occurs.
C. Deference to the Federal Election Commission
Because of the weak nature of the FEC and the importance of
the subject matter it oversees, deference to the FEC should only be
given when the Commission can show an adequate justification for
its interpretation of a regulation. The CRFCC court claimed it followed the admonition of the Supreme Court in Chevron U.SA. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,67 which held that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."' Deference to an agency
is inappropriate when the agency has adopted an interpretation of a
regulation that is inconsistent with prior interpretations of the regulation or is logically inapplicable to the issue under consideration.
This is especially true when there are constitutional issues and concerns that must be addressed.
The Tenth Circuit cited Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 9 (DSCC), where the Supreme Court noted that "the Commission is precisely the type of
agency to which deference should presumptively be afforded,"7 to
support its deference to the Commission on the interpretation of
§ 441a(d)(3). In DSCC, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee challenged the legality of state and local Republican Party
committees assigning their rights to make coordinated contributions
to candidates of the National Republican Senatorial Committee
(NRSC).71 The Democrats claimed that the arrangement with the

guiding light behind reform legislation . . . legislative strategists chose instead
to immunize their proposals from adoption by potential allies across the aisle.
Id. at 135-36.
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
67. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
68. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1021.
69. 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
70. Id. at 37.
71. Id. at 30.
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NRSC violated the statute, as the NRSC was only empowered to
make contributions to candidates and not act as the agent of state
and local party committees.72 The Court noted that the FEC had
maintained a clear and consistent position on the issue of assignment,' and the Commission had unanimously dismissed the
Democrats' complaint that the NRSC had violated § 441a(d).74
The DSCC Court's statement about deference arose because the
Commission unanimously found that no violation occurred. DSCC,
therefore, is a case of deference to "prosecutorial discretion."
CRFCC presents a distinctly different factual scenario. The
Tenth Circuit cited two Advisory Opinions issued by the FEC as
evidence that the Commission had adopted a position that required
deference.75 However, neither of these Advisory Opinions dealt
with a situation in which a party expended money prior to the
nomination of candidates by the other party.76 Moreover, the court
noted that the FEC appeared to have modified its position previously' without addressing the reasonableness of the new interpretation.7 s Deference may not be proper when an agency has not
clearly established a position prior to litigating an issue."

72. Id. at 29-30.
73. Id. The Court noted that the FEC had consistently adhered to the same position in
the case since 1976. Id. at 38. Moreover, the FEC had been presented with at least three
challenges to its interpretation but arrived at the same conclusion each time. Id.
74. Id. at 31.
75. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1021-22.
76. Advisory Opinion (AO) 1984-15 was provided to the Republican Party by the FEC
after the party requested a determination about the propriety of spending for television ads
attacking the potential opponent that would be nominated by the Democrats to oppose
President Reagan. See Reporting Expenditures for Anti-Democratic Television Ads
(AO 1984-15), 1 Fed. Election Camp. Fm. Guide (CCH) IJ 5766 (May 31, 1984). In
AO 1985-14, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee sought a determination
about publicity it proposed focusing on several members of Congress not all of whom
had opponents. See Attribution of Congressional Campaign Committee Expenditures
(AO 1985-14), 2 Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) [ 5819 (May 30, 1985).
77. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1022 n.7. The court noted that Corporate Support for Party
Convention (AO 1978-46), 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fm. Guide (CCH) II 5348 (Sept. 5,
1978), adopted a restrictive interpretation of § 441a that only applied the regulations to
party expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. The
position relied on by the circuit court was set forth in AO 1984-15. Reporting Expenditures for Anti-Democratic Television Ads (AO 1984-15), 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin.
Guide (CCH) I 5766 (May 31, 1984). That opinion construed § 441a(d) to regulate expenditures that specifically identify a candidate and convey an election-oriented message.
Id.
78. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1022 n.7.
79. The issue of deference to an ambiguous interpretation of a regulation was addressed in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d
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While CRFCC deferred to the authority of the FEC, the Tenth
Circuit was not required to reach the conclusion it did in this case.
The specific constitutional issue raised by the appellees, the First
Amendment rights of political parties to make truly independent
expenditures, has never been addressed by the courts. Furthermore,
the courts have never directly addressed the rights of parties and
independent political committees together. This has resulted in each
entity being subject to different standards and regulations with
respect to their fundamental First Amendment rights. Additionally,
campaign finance is too important an area for the courts to leave
to the sole discretion of Congress. Congress has failed to enact
meaningful reform of campaign finance in the wake of the changes
that have occurred in the system since Buckley. Finally, deference
to the FEC has become problematic in situations when the FEC
fails to clearly articulate its regulatory interpretations in a consistent manner. The court ought to defer to the Commission only
after carefully scrutinizing the FEC's prior actions.
In light of the Congress's and the President's failure to act and
their interest in perpetuating the status quo, the federal courts must
not only scrutinize their actions, but also actively seek to remedy
the inequities that have emerged in the current system. This requires addressing the regulatory inconsistencies that have emerged
since the Supreme Court ruled in Buckley. The inequities and disparities in the current system of campaign finance are likely to
persist unless the courts harmonize the law as applied to similarly
situated political entities.

1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (NRSC). In NRSC, the court refused to defer to the FEC's interpretation of a regulation due to its failure to provide any "administrative construction" of
the regulation in question. Id. at 1475-76. The court stated,
But what, in this case, is the Commission's construction? Do we look to the
Commission's litigating position, in which it supports the district court's reading
of "direction or control"? Do we rely on the presumably identical reading of
the regulation by the three Commissioners who voted in favor of finding probable cause? Or do we defer to the contrary interpretation of the three Commissioners who voted against pursuing the complaint?
Id. at 1476.
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IV. TOWARDS A POST-BUCKLEY APPROACH TO THE REGULATION
OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The decision in CRFCC manifests the need for courts to adopt
a more aggressive attitude in the regulation of campaigns and elections. The courts must address practices that emerge as a result of
prior legislation and judicial decision. They must then seek to
rectify and harmonize any inequities that emerge over time with
respect to the rights and abilities of political actors. These concerns
manifest themselves in CRFCC. The court limited its analysis to
the prevention of corruption as justification of the limitation placed
upon political parties to make independent expenditures. The traditional interpretation of corruption is not applicable to political
parties and must be abandoned. Additionally, the court did not
address the dearth of analysis as to the fundamental similarity
between First Amendment rights of independent political committees and political parties. The First Amendment rights of each
should encompass independent expenditures. Although parties and
independent political committees are different and should be subject
to somewhat different regulations, independent committees are not
entitled to greater speech and associational rights than political
parties.
A.

PoliticalParties Are Not Logically Subject to Corruption
Analysis

The policy concern of preventing corruption is central to the
analysis of the Tenth Circuit in its refusal to recognize that limitations on the ability of political parties to make independent expenditures constitute a violation of the First Amendment speech and
associational interests of political parties."0 In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that limitations on campaign contributions did
not violate the First Amendment as they served to prevent "corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on
candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office."'"
The Court's analysis focused upon the belief that political contributors may exact "political quid pro quo's"82 from candidates. Thus,

80. See CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1023-24.
81. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
82. Id. at 26.
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prevention of "corruption" is the "single narrow exception to the
rule that limits
on political activity [are] contrary to the First
'3
Amendment.
This view of corruption has been inadequately analyzed in
decisions following Buckley. 4 First, the Buckley Court's corruption
analysis emerged at a time when independent political committees
played an insignificant role in campaigns." This is important because today independent expenditures86 on behalf of a candidate
may play a more significant role in a candidate's election than the
financial assistance of direct contributors. 7 The Court in Buckley
believed that independent expenditures provided little assistance to
candidates and therefore held little potential for corruption, whereas
contributions were inherently corrupting.8 This view has been
questioned by both academics89 and members of the Court.'
83. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981); see also
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225 (1989) (noting
such burdens must serve "a compelling governmental interest").
84. See Kenneth J. Levit, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v.
Valeo, 103 YA. LJ. 469, 473 (1993) ("Mhe Court established a dichotomy that has
since governed campaign-finance regulation . . . . [Tihe Court understood the corruption
risk solely in terms of the threat of quid pro quo corruption-dollars given in return for
political favors. Large contributions heightened this risk while unrestrained expenditures
did not.").
85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (noting that independent committees "may well provide
little assistance to the candidate's campaign"); see also Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Rethinking
Regulation of Independent Expenditures by PACs, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 13, 35-38
(1984) (discussing the history of corruption analysis and its current meaninglessness as
applied to independent expenditures).
86. In 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994), the statute defines an independent expenditure as
one "made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized
committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate."
87. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
88. See Andrew P. Buschbaum, Campaign Finance Re-Reform: The Regulation of Independent Political Committees, 71 CAL. L. REV. 673, 683 (1983) (noting that the Court
mistakenly differentiated between the corrupting influence of expenditures and contributions
based upon its belief that independent expenditures were ineffective and that such expenditures were truly independent).
89. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1063 (1985) (stating
that the view adopted by the Supreme Court "may no longer support a different level of
scrutiny for contribution[s] than for expenditure[s]"); Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First
Amendment: A Critical FunctionalistApproach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1273, 1355 n.304 (1983) (The contribution-expenditure distinction fails to recognize that independent expenditures may be corrupting- "The
larger and more exceptional the expenditure, the more likely it is that the candidate will
notice and respond to it, even without any direct coordination or prearrangement."); An-
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The court followed that analysis in CRFCC, holding that "[tihe
opportunity for abuse is greater when the contributions (or in the
instant case, coordinated expenditures) derive from sources inherently aligned with the candidate, rather than with independent
expenditures."'" The problem posed by this distinction is best illustrated in the case of Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee92 (NCPAC). In NCPAC,

the Court struck down a limitation on independent expenditures
furthering the campaign of a presidential candidate accepting public
financing.93 The Supreme Court found that no financial "quid pro
quo" exists when an independent expenditure is made in support of
a candidate." In its decision, the Court noted,
The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or
reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called
corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is
the presentation to the electorate of varying points of
view."
By reaching this conclusion, the NCPAC Court has rendered
the corruption analysis largely meaningless because independent
drew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse over Corporate and Individual Political Activity, 14 CARDozO L. REV. 1343, 1347 n.11 (1993) (rejecting the Buckley distinction and noting that "few constitutional jurists and scholars"
continue to support such a distinction); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 CoLum. L. REV. 1390, 1395 (1994) ("[l]t is not clear that this
distinction is relevant, since expenditures on behalf of a candidate can create some of the
dangers of contributions.").
90. Justice Marshall has stated, "I disagree that the limitations on contributions and
expenditures have significantly different impacts on First Amendment freedoms. . . . Thus,
I do not see how one interest can be deemed more compelling than the other. . .. I am
now unpersuaded by the distinction established in Buckley." Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he noted in a footnote that originally three of the eight Justices that
had heard Buckley, Burger, C.J., White, J. and Blackmun, J., held the same view. Id. at
520 n.*.
91. 59 F.3d at 1024.
92. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
93. Id. at 482. In 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1994), the statute makes it a criminal offense
for an independent political committee to expend more than $1,000 to further the campaign of a Presidential candidate who elects public financing of the candidate's general
election campaign.
94. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497 ("The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro
quo: dollars for political favors. But here the conduct proscribed is not contributions to
the candidate, but independent expenditures in support of the candidate.").
95. Id. at 498.
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expenditures have the same potential for corruption as contributions.96 In light of this view of the corrupting influence of independent expenditures, the distinction between independent expenditures, which are not contributions, and coordinated expenditures,
which are classified as contributions, is now unclear.' This problem is magnified when courts adhere to the "quid pro quo" view
of corruption while appearing to find that independent expenditures
do not produce the potential for such arrangement.9 8 As a result
of the decisions in Buckley and NCPAC, independent political
committees may provide large contributions to candidates in the
form of independent expenditures. The Supreme Court has held
that the potential for corruption posed by such expenditures is
insufficient to justify the intrusion upon the speech rights of such
committees." However, the campaign expenditures of political
parties remain limited due to the questionable belief that parties
can corrupt their own candidates.1te
This dichotomy is problematic. Independent political committees generally have a much narrower focus and narrower base of
support than do political parties. Today, independent political committees generally take the form of Political Action Committees
(PACs). Although the direct contributions of such organizations are
limited, 10' their ability to undertake other indirect campaign activ-

96. The facts in NCPAC illustrate the superficial distinction between coordinated and
independent expenditures. NCPAC received support from Ronald Reagan in its fundraising
as early as 1975. NCPAC's director, John Dolan, had a brother who worked for Reagan
in the 1980 election. Moreover, NCPAC's offices were housed in the same building as
several important Reagan campaign officials. Buschbaum, supra note 88, at 675 n.15.
97. The Tenth Circuit noted,
The Buckley opinion distinguished between independent expenditures . . . and
coordinated expenditures. The Buckley opinion unequivocally stated that controlled or coordinated expenditures are treated as "contributions rather than
expenditures" . . . Although Buckley found the ceiling on independent expenditures failed to serve substantial enough government interests to be constitutional,
it reached the opposite conclusion as to limitations on expenditures by national
or state political parties.
CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47 n.53, 55-59 n.67).
98. See, e.g., id. at 1024.
99. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 501.
100. See infra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
101. Under 2 U.S.C. § 441a(2) (1994),
No multicandidate political committee shall make contributions(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect
to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed
$5,000;
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ities are not." Along with this, the prohibition on independent
expenditures by political parties establishes a 'system that provides
little regulation of political committees; political parties are subject
to direct voter control where as independent political committees
are only subject to control by the populace indirectly. 3
The "quid pro quo" view of corruption is not logically applicable to political parties. It is difficult to envision how an individual
who has been selected by a political party can be corrupted by the
contributions of the party."° The candidate has been selected because the candidate's views and opinions correspond to those held
by other members of the party. 05 It is unclear why it is an "essential feature of democracy" for a candidate to modify a position
as a result of a PAC's independent expenditure," ° but it is corrupt for a candidate to receive the benefit of a similar expenditure
by the party whose banner the candidate carries. 7
In Buckley, the Supreme Court refused to find that preventing
corruption would adequately justify limitations on independent expenditures;... however, it never applied that analysis directly to
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national
political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any
candidate, in any calendar year, which, in the aggregate, exceed $15,000;
or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the
aggregate, exceed $5,000.
102. See WILLIAM CROMrY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 133 (2d ed. 1984) (noting
that PACs aggressively engage in activities other than contributions to candidates, such as
supplying support personnel for candidates they favor or recruiting candidates to oppose
candidates favored by the party).
103. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
104. See Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas,
Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FoRDHAM L. REv. 53, 105 (1987) (noting that the ability
of parties to select candidates differentiates them from other political actors).
105. Id.
106. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
107. See Nahra, supra note 104, at 105-06 (noting that parties are inherently incapable
of "quid pro quo" exchanges).
108. 424 U.S. at 45. The Court noted,
It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and
groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of
election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign. Yet no
substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing provision
designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper influence
over candidates for elective office.
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political parties. It is this view of preventing corruption that the
Tenth Circuit used to justify rejecting the counterclaim of the Colorado Republicans. The court focused on the finding that the First
Amendment rights of the Colorado Republicans had not been infringed, to stating, "We cannot say the dangers of domination that
underlay the Supreme Court's acceptance of the constitutionality of
contribution limits are not present in political party expenditures."'1' The court feared domination of pre-primary expenditures
by incumbents."' However, the court explicitly deferred to the
expertise of the same incumbents in Congress who wrote the statute." 2 In this case, neither party had nominated a candidate and
no incumbent sought reelection, bringing the applicability of corruption analysis into question. By adhering to the analysis of corruption as developed in another context, the Tenth Circuit failed to
seize the opportunity to grant political parties the same speech
rights possessed by every American individual and independent
political committee. The court found "corruption" or the "appearance of corruption" to exist where there was actually little possibility of its occurrence.
The view of corruption espoused in Buckley emerged out of an
environment in which independent expenditures had not yet become
important or effective." 3 Moreover, direct contributions had been
proven to exhibit the kind of corruption the Court feared and identified. ' 4 This situation has changed since the decision in Buckley.

109. 59 F.3d at 1024.
110. Id.
t11.
See id.
112. Id.
113. Buschbaum, supra note 88, at 683; see also Leatherberry, supra note 85, at 21
(noting, however, that "[a]fter Buckley, all PACs had an incentive to make independent
expenditures rather than contributions.").
114. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed the history of campaign finance abuses giving rise to concerns of corruption or the perception of corruption in its
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court relied on the
abuses that occurred in the 1972 campaign as support for the need for campaign finance
reform. See id. at 839-40. The court specifically noted the $2 million contribution by the
dairy producers to support Nixon's reelection and the appearance that the contributions
resulted in Nixon modifying policies to favor the industry. Id. at 839 n.36. Moreover, the
court noted that for the purpose of providing a basis for regulating campaign contributions, the perception or appearance of corruption was sufficient to justify regulation even
if actual corruption could not be shown. Id. With respect to contributions to members of
Congress, the court identified contributions by H. Ross Perot as an example of "lavish
contributions by groups or individuals with special interests to legislators from both parties." Id. at 839 n.37.
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Independent political organizations have become more astute and
effective in providing indirect contributions to candidates. It is not
apparent, however, that the Supreme Court would necessarily hold
that the fear of corruption could justify restraints on the speech and
associational rights of political parties, as the contribution limits
imposed on parties were never analyzed in such a context."' The
position adopted by the Tenth Circuit-that 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)
prevents parties from corrupting candidates, and therefore constitutes a permissible imposition upon political speech-is a questionable basis for limitation of the First Amendment as the courts have
not analyzed the ability of political parties to corrupt their own
candidates.
B.

PoliticalPartiesAre Entitled to the Same Rights as Exercised
by Independent Political Committees

The Tenth Circuit rejected the First Amendment claim of the
Colorado Republicans, holding that limitations on coordinated contributions made by political parties constituted "a permissible burden on speech and association."' " 6 The court noted that the FEC
believed that Buckley and its progeny stood for the premise that
distinctions between independent expenditures and contributions
were constitutionally relevant. 7 As previously mentioned, the
court also found that the potential for corruption is greater when
the source is "inherently aligned with the candidate."". While
this may be true, application of this view to political parties is
questionable. The court noted that "[tihe same reasoning the Supreme Court used to uphold the constitutionality of other contribution limitations applies when analyzing the constitutionality of
limits on coordinated expenditures by political committees."". 9
However, it then qualified its statement in a footnote that recognized that Buckley never reached the First Amendment implications
of the regulation to political parties."
The court supported its decision by providing various justifications for limiting coordinated expenditures. Section 441a(d)(3) not
only prevented corruption, but it also equalized "the relative ability

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 59 n.67.
CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1023.
Id. at 1023-24.
Id at 1024.
i (footnote omitted).
Id- at 1024 n.1.
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of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections."'' Moreover,
these limitations offered a means to limit campaign costs and enhance access to the political process."z However, in Buckley, after
noting the existence of such benefits to elections, the Court stated
that "[it is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption" to justify
limits on campaign contributions.'23 These justifications for upholding the limitation found in § 441a(d)(3) were not accepted in
Buckley, and were not applied to political parties.'24
The CRFCC court recognized that political parties and their
activities do differ from the independent expenditures and activities
of independent political committees. However, contrary to the
court's claim that parties present a greater threat of corruption than
entities making independent expenditures," z political parties are
the only political actors that can promote the goals Congress
sought to promote when it originally adopted the FECA.'" Furthermore, it is not clear that the parties can corrupt candidates they
have selected by making coordinated expenditures on their behalf. 27 As previously discussed, the corruption analysis has only
been applied to situations in which individuals or independent
political committees engaged in expenditures and contributions."
Prior to CRFCC, there had never been an explicit discussion or
ruling on the issue as it relates to political parties.
Parties are central to American politics. Although their power
and roles have declined, they are essential elements to overcoming
the disassociation Americans have with the political system. The
decline of the party and the rise of the independent political committee have coincided with the adoption of the FECA and Buckley.
Allowing parties to fully exercise their First Amendment rights
may facilitate a general improvement in both the perceived and the
actual quality of American politics and elections.

121. Id. at 1024 (citing Buckley, 434 U.S. at 26).
122. Id.
123. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
124. See id. at 24-29 (discussing contribution limitations imposed on individuals).
125. CRFCC, 59 F.3d at 1024.
126. See Nahra, supra note 104, at 87 (noting that parties create an emotional link
between the populace and elected officials which may enhance and individual's sense of
personal involvement and increase institutional legitimacy).
127. See Clarissa Long, Note, Shouting Down the Voice of the People: Political Parties,
Powerful PACs, and Concerns About Corruption, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1188-89 (1994).
128. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
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Political parties can bring diverse political views of Americans
together. The parties are able to limit the destructive impact of
factionalism by providing a structure to bring divergent social and
ideological groups together. 29 Independent political committees
represent narrow views and agendas. They possess significant but
disproportionate power due to their ability to raise money and
focus the support of their followers upon limited issues. 3 Parties
provide an effective counter to the divisive and destructive influence of independent political committees.'' If political parties
were able to increase their financial support for their own candidates, they could decrease the reliance on and diminish the power
of independent political groups.'32 Elections would be enhanced if
parties could guarantee that competent candidates would have the
resources to effectively run campaigns. 3 Currently, many congressional races are under-contested because challengers often do
not have the financial resources to challenge incumbents"3 ' or the
independently wealthy. 5 If the parties provided candidates with

129. See Long, supra note 127, at 1176 n.123; see also Lloyd N. Cutler, Now Is the
Time for All Good Men. . ., 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387, 389 (1989) (arguing that
national political parties are broadly based and cut across the narrow interests represented
by the factions that James Madison feared).
130. See Long, supra note 127, at 1174.
131. Id at 1173.
132. See Nahra, supra note 104, at 86.
133. Id. at 107.
134. Incumbency provides the greatest security for members of Congress seeking reelection. In 1988, only six incumbent Representatives of 408 seeking reelection lost, and five
incumbent Senators lost. Richard A. Ryan, Anger at Politicians Won't Result in Loss of
Jobs for Congress, GANNETT NEws SERvICE, Oct. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File. In the 1990 congressional elections, this was evidenced by the fact
that even though Americans expressed great dissatisfaction with Congress, 96% of incumbent House members and 96.9% of Senators were reelected. Elaine S. Povich, In Congress, Money Talks--and Re-elects, Ci. TRIB., Nov. 20, 1990, at News 1, News 10.
Many elections are non-competitive due to underfunded challengers or incumbents who
raise enough money to preempt the campaigns of legitimate challengers. In 1990, 95% of
House incumbents seeking re-election were either unopposed or had financially non-competitive opponents. Only 23 of 405 incumbent members faced challengers with more than
50% of the incumbent's financial resources. Id.
135. This trend has coincided with the rise of wealthy candidates who are willing to
spend millions of their own money in an attempt to get elected. Michael Huffington of
California has set records for expenditures of personal wealth in elections for the House
and Senate. In 1992, Huffington spent $5.2 million of his own money to get elected to
the House of Representatives. Glenn F. Bunting, Newcomers Quickly Join the PAC Pursuit, L.A. TMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at A3. Huffington then set the record for personal expenditures for a Senate election when he spent $27.8 million of his own money in his
failed attempt to defeat Diane Fienstein in the 1994 California senatorial election. Craig
Winneker & Amy Keller, Eight Well-Heeled Freshmen Make Our Annual List of
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sufficient financial support to effectively contest elections, there
may be an improvement in both party competition and the public

view of American politics.

36

The parties may make their candi-

dates more attentive to the candidates actual constituents and the
issues concerning them by reducing the reliance of such candidates
on PACs and independent expenditures by independent political
committees. Candidates who have been weaned
off of this money
37
may become more responsive to the public.
Allowing parties to exercise the same speech and associational
rights as individuals and independent political committees may
infuse greater accountability and responsibility into our political
system. As currently formulated, the limitation on campaign contributions by political parties prevents political parties from campaigning against their own candidates.'
It is presumptuous to
assume that political parties always endorse each of their candidates identically, 39 or even at all."4 It is impossible to justify

Congress's Wealthiest Members, RoLL CALL 50, Jan. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File. The fifty wealthiest members of the House and Senate have, individually, net worths of at least $2 million. Id.
136. See Long, supra note 127, at 1176 nn.120-28 (discussing the need for and the
benefits from enhanced party competition).
137. See id. at 1179-80.
138. As currently written, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1994) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.7 (1994)
limit expenditures by parties. Once a committee assigns its rights to make expenditures
under these statutes and regulations, and once the limits are met, the party is foreclosed
from further contributions or expenditures in that election. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(2) to
(d)(3); 11 C.F.R. § I10.7(a)(2), (b)(2). Thus, if a party campaigns against its nominee, it
would be limited to the amount in the statute or the amount it had not expended.
139. See Long, supra note 127, at 1174 (noting that "[a] political party does not display identical support for all its candidates").
140. Since 1980, the Republican party or committees within the party have broken from
supporting Republican candidates for Congress on at least two significant occasions. In
1982, some California Republican leaders and local committees launched the write-in
campaign of Ron Packard after they discovered that the party's nominee, Johnnie Crean,
had engaged in questionable practices in the primary. The House: Pipeline and Out of
Line; Scout's Honor, TIME, Oct. 25, 1982, at 37, 37. Furthermore, the local Republican's
conduct was directly contrary to that of the national party, which provided a contribution
of $50,000 and the endorsement of President Reagan. Id. Packard went on to win the
election. Barry M. Horstman, Four Incumbents Heavily Favored in Congressional Races,
L.A. TIMEs, May 22, 1986, at B 1.
The 1990 Louisiana election for the Senate resulted in the Republican party repudiating its nominee, former Klansman, David Duke and endorsing the Democrat incumbent
Bennett Johnston. Louisiana has a unique open primary system in which all candidates
compete against each other regardless of party affiliation. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes, the top two vote-getters face each other in the general election. Hugh
Aynesworth, Duke's Spector Forces GOP Pick Out of Race, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1990,
at Al, All. When mainstream Republicans fared poorly in the polls, Republicans feared

1996]

TIME TO DEVELOP A POST-BUCKLEY APPROACH

629

limitations on party expenditures that prevent the party from spending money to defeat a candidate nominated for office by the party
who is inimical to the interests and beliefs of the party. Parties
must have the ability to support or oppose candidates. 4 ' Without

such power, it is difficult for them to maintain credibility. If party
members disagree with the actions of party leadership, they must
have the opportunity and ability to express themselves as independent members of the party without having their speech and association rights usurped by the party's collective ability to make expenditures in conjunction with general elections.
The voters may express their approval or disapproval with
political parties through competition between the parties. This is
not the case with independent political committees. If voters disapprove of a party's message, contributors, 42 or direction, they may
vote against a party. 43 No such check exists on independent political committees. Although voters may turn against candidates
who are the "beneficiaries" of independent expenditures,' no
mechanism exists for directly rejecting the message of the expendithat Duke would finish second to Johnston and that anti-incumbent sentiment would prevent Johnston from obtaining a majority. Id. Thus, the national party denounced Duke,
eight Republican members of the Senate endorsed Johnston, and the Republican candidate
endorsed by President Bush withdrew after he lost the backing of the national party,
which feared that he would be unable to defeat Duke and finish second to Johnston in
the primary election. Id.
141. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224
(1989). In discussing California's prohibition on primary election endorsements by political
parties, the Eu Court stated, "Barring political parties from endorsing and opposing candidates not only burdens their freedom of speech but also infringes upon their freedom of
association. It is well settled that partisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
142. See Long, supra note 127, at 1188.
143. See id. An excellent example of this check on parties is the 1993 Canadian election. In that election, Canadian voters sent a message to the ruling Progressive Conservative party by universally rejecting it. The party, which had 155 seats in the House of
Commons and were lead by Prime Minister Kim Campbell, lost all of its seats but two.
Arnold Beichman, Turning a Corner in Canada, WASH. TIMES, June 12, 1994, at B4.
144. An example of such voter backlash occurred in the 1982 Maryland Senate campaign. NCPAC unsuccessfully spent over $650,000 to defeat Senator Paul Sarbanes. Bart
Bames, Co-founder of NCPAC John (Terry) Dolan Dies, WASH. PosT, Dec. 31, 1986, at
B6. As a result of the spending, Sarbanes was able to energize his nationwide
fundraising. Many residents of Maryland were offended by the PACs activities and
Sarbanes capitalized on their animosity towards outside influence on the campaign. Michel
McQueen, Group's Anti-Mikulski TV Ad Draws Criticism; Chavez Disassociates Herself
from Effort, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1986, at B5 (discussing the Sarbanes situation and the
activities of the Anti-Terrorism American Committee making independent expenditures
against then Representative Barbara Mikulski who was seeking the Democratic nomination
to the Senate from Maryland).
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tures made by the independent committees. Parties infuse the system with a measure of accountability. However, accountability is
eclipsed in a system that favors 4those
who succeed in obtaining
5
support from independent sources.
If parties were able to increase their expenditures to support
their candidates, the factionalism that exists in American politics
today may decline. Parties provide a strong opponent to the influence of independent political committees." Parties offer structures that can facilitate consensus and overcome the divisiveness
that seems to have increased in American politics. 47 Any interpretation of the law that differentiates First Amendment rights of
political parties from those of independent political committees creates a perverse system of political expression and accountability.
The strength of political parties and political committees is partially
measured by their ability to mobilize their supporters. Mobilization
today consists of raising money to either be contributed"a to the
candidate by a party or expended 49 on behalf of the candidate by
an independent political committee. In NCPAC, the Court stated,
We also reject the notion that the PACs' form of organization or method of solicitation diminishes their entitlement
to First Amendment protection. The First Amendment freedom of association is squarely implicated in these cases.
NCPAC and FCM are mechanisms by which large numbers
of individuals of modest means can join together in organizations which serve to "amplif[y] the voice of their adherents." 50
Campaign finance law exists in a dynamic world.' Since the
decision in Buckley, party cohesion has declined considerably,'
PACs have risen in importance, 53 and individual contributors
145. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
146. See Long, supra note 127, at 1173.
147. See id. at 1177.
148. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
149. See e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text.
150. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 494 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22).
151. See supra note 108.
152. See SORAUF, supra note 39, at 241 (noting that even though parties have the ability to raise significant amounts of money, they appear to be unable to energize public
opinion and rally popular support as they once were able to); Long, supra note 127, at
1163 (noting that "political parties have lost much of their control over their candidates'
actions"); Nahra, supra note 104, at 88 n.225 (noting that the change in support of American parties is a "dealignment" rather than a realignment).
153. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18
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have become less important in political fundraising.'54 Decisions
after Buckley have expanded the power and role of independent
political committees. Most independent expenditures have become
anything but independent. 5 NCPAC extended the impact of
Buckley by rejecting limitations on independent expenditures on
behalf of presidential candidates.'56 Thus, virtually no limit exists
upon the power and ability of entities other than political parties to
expend unlimited amounts of money in federal elections. Furthermore, the lack of restraint upon such expenditures provides PACs
with the opportunity not only to contribute to a candidate, but also
spend large amounts on the candidate's behalf.'' The question
the courts should address is whether this fundamental shift in political power is beneficial to our system.
If the expenditures of PACs are "entitled to full First Amendment protection,"'' 8 then political parties-entities arguably offering greater benefits to the political process than the independent
political committees-must be given the same protection. The benefits of greater expenditures by political parties clearly outweigh the
potential for parties corrupting their own. When the reality of independent expenditures versus coordinated expenditures is viewed as
more than the superficial expenditure versus contribution distinction
that currently exists, it becomes obvious that although parties differ
from independent committees, their First Amendment interests are
entitled to the same protection.

HOFSTRA L. REV. 213, 219 n.33 (1989) (arguing that the reforms and decisions of the
1970s "ushered in a greatly enlarged PAC role").
154. See LARRY J. SABATO, PAYING FOR ELECTIONS 61 (1989) (noting that between
1978 and 1984 individual contributions of less than $100 to candidates for Congress declined from 38% of total contributions to 20%). Additionally, individuals have been replaced as the source of a majority of campaign contributions. Between 1978 and 1984
campaign contributions by individuals to congressional candidates declined from 61% to
only 49%. Id. at 83 n.2.
155. See Buschbaum, supra note 88, at 675 n.15 (discussing the close relationship between entities making independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate with the staff,
consultants, and supporters of the candidate).
156. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
157. See Long, supra note 127, at 1180 (arguing that limitations on PAC contributions
have lead many to pursue independent expenditures as a means of exerting corrupt influences).
158. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496.
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CONCLUSION

The decision of the court in CRFCC demonstrates that issues
exist that justify a change in the approach courts have taken in
addressing campaign finance. First, courts must become more active and less deferential to Congress, the FEC, and prior judicial
decisions in light of the results produced by Buckley and its progeny. Next, inconsistencies exist in the application of quid pro quo
corruption analysis to political parties. Finally, even though parties
differ from independent political committees, they must have the
same First Amendment speech and association rights. It is clear
that there is a need for a definitive decision about the First
Amendment rights of political parties. There is no longer any justification for the disparate treatment of independent expenditures and
coordinated expenditures. Political parties must be allowed to exercise the same First Amendment rights as any other actor or entity
in the political arena.
GEOFFREY M. WARDLE

